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Abstract 
 
Microfinance is defined as small scale loans designed for less fortunate citizens. Ever 
since its creation, an economic development tactic that was hoped to greatly benefit developing 
economies, has been under much scrutiny. Why is this supposed poverty alleviating lending tool 
6 
 
under such scrutiny? Well a quick outlook on Compartamos Banco profit statistics along with 
knowing that their loan default rate is near one percent is a good place to start. Latin America has 
taken Yunus’s social welfare Microfinance model and turned it into a profit generating giant with 
an interest income of 74.7% in the Mexican Microfinance sector.
1
 Although profits are good for 
some, they usually come at a cost for others. The others in this case have been the public 
Microfinance institutions in Mexico. Compartamos has dominated the Microfinance competition 
in Mexico and been able to charge interest rates of up to 120%. Due to this competitive 
advantage, other Microfinance institutions have been forced to adopt this dangerously high 
microcredit lending rate. Unlike the country of Peru, Mexico’s Microfinance institutions have 
stood out for their high profit business models. In Peru, the country has been able to establish a 
complétive microcredit rate that changes with the relative price of good in the market. The 
competitive rate has allowed for balanced competition along with a national commitment to 
Microfinance. Commercial banks have started to purchase Microfinance institutions in the 
country of Peru and this has had a large impact on the success of the sector. With the backing of 
a large corporate structure, Microfinance institutions have had the ability to expand operations to 
the rural sector of the economy which has a high demand for microcredit. Peru’s has been the 
pioneer for Microfinance in Latin America and Mexico should learn from their success story. 
 
Microfinance in Latin America 
 
Throughout the history of society, humans have developed into three different social 
classes to determine one's wealth. Their is the upper class, the middle class, and the lower class. 
The upper classes consist of the individuals with the most wealth and the lower class are the 
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individuals with the least wealth. Over time, there has been a desire along with a need to raise the 
income of the lower class citizens or the poor individuals. A group is only as strong as its 
weakest link. These lower income individuals, majority of the time, did not choose to be in the 
position that they are in. To try and help improve the livelihoods of these less fortunate citizens, 
governments along with global help groups have designed aid programs. These aid programs 
span from: conditional cash transfers; to microfinance; to the job guarantee program. All of these 
programs were designed and implemented with the same goal in mind. The plan was to alleviate 
as many citizens as possible over the regions poverty line. Poverty, negatively affects a nation 
economy in several ways. 
What does poverty look like in today's world? Nearly 1/2 of the world’s population, more 
than 3 billion people live on less than $2.50 a day. More than 1.3 billion live in extreme poverty, 
less than $1.25 a day. There are over a billion children worldwide living in poverty. According to 
UNICEF, 22,000 children die each day due to poverty, and 805 million people worldwide do not 
have enough food to eat. More than 750 million people lack adequate access to clean drinking 
water. In 2011, 165 million children under the age of 5 were stunted (reduced rate of growth and 
development) due to chronic malnutrition. Preventable diseases like diarrhea and pneumonia take 
the lives of 2 million children a year who are too poor to afford proper treatment. One out of 
every four humans live without electricity, approximately 1.6 billion people. Oxfam estimates 
that it would take $60 billion annually to end extreme global poverty. 
2
This is still $40 billion 
less than the net worth of current Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos. So why does poverty still exist 
today?  
There is no concrete definition for the global phenomenon of poverty that persists in the 
modern world. The answer “greed” may suffice for some but in the grand scheme of things, each 
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and every individual has not been presented with the same equal rights and the fight against 
poverty has been an ongoing battle since the start of mankind. Humans all across the globe are 
exposed to the deep dangers of poverty. The definition of the word poverty in the Merriam-
Webster dictionary is defined as, “the state of one who lacks a usual or socially acceptable 
amount of money or material possessions.” The term can be better defined as one lacking the 
necessary materials provided in an economy in order to succeed.  
Poverty does not have a crippling effect on just the citizens living within it, but on the 
whole economy as well. For an economy to perform at an efficient and sustainable level, the 
amount of citizens living in impoverished conditions must be minimized as much as possible. As 
time has gone on, countries like the United States have been able to control the poverty level of 
its citizens. Due to our,  non-corrupt political systems and an efficient economy, the United 
States has been fairly successful in its fight against poverty thus far. In America today, 12.3% of 
the population lives below the poverty line.
3
 The poverty line is different from country to country 
and varies upon the income level of each specific nation. A paramount example is the country of 
Mexico, with the percentage of citizens living below the poverty line is 46.2%.
4
  
 The level of poverty experienced by the Mexican economy has been fairly troublesome 
for its citizens. Poverty along with political corruption has stunted the growth of this economy 
overtime and Mexico is not just a unique case. The country of Haiti has the highest level of 
poverty with a poverty rate of 77%.
5
 As time has gone on, governments along with several non 
profit groups and organizations such as the United Nations, have developed policies and 
programs to aid in the fight against poverty. Countries have spent billions of dollars in this fight 
                                               
3
Semega Jessica, Fontenot Kayla , Kollar Melissa. 2017. “ Income and Poverty in the United States: 2016” United 
States Census Bureau 1-72 
4
Rama Anahi and Yukhananov 2015. “Mexican government says poverty rate rose to 46.2 percent in 2014” Reuters 
5
 Sauter Michael B., Hess Alexander, and Weigley Samuel 2012 “The 10 Poorest Countries in the World” Fox 
Business 
9 
 
and the general consensus on foreign aid and anti-poverty programs have been mixed so far. 
Their seems to be a desire for improvement in the realm of developing economics.   
The funds these developing nations receive from foreign aid have been used in a variety 
of different ways to battle poverty. Foreign aid can be defined as more developed nations, such 
as the United States, providing funding to aid developing nations. Developed nations are 
countries with sustainable levels of GDP per capita, low poverty levels, and normal levels of 
income distribution. Developing nations are countries on a mission to establish these efficient 
economic levels as a whole, and the idea of foreign aid has existed since the early 19th century 
and has become a normal function of a developed nations economy since the 1920s.
6
 An 
example of an aid program, one that has been fairly successful especially within the education 
sector of the Mexican economy, is conditional cash transfers. Mexico has a program known as, 
Oportunidades. This anti-poverty program provides cash transfers to citizens contingent upon 
investments in human capital. The program focuses on improvement in education, health, and 
nutrition and works by providing cash to families an individuals who abide by regular school 
attendance and health clinic visits.
7
 This program resulted in an increase in school attendance 
along with a more balanced diet in the lives of these Mexican citizens.  
 The results of this three year anti-poverty program are great and if funding were to 
continue to flow into Oportunidades, Mexico could potentially see a school attendance rate as 
high as the United States. But foreign aid funding and government funding is not unlimited. 
Mexico is expected to receive $78,910,000 in foreign aid for the year 2019.
8
A problem within 
these conditional cash transfers program is that when the funding for these programs evaporate, 
so does the increases in school attendance as well as the balanced diet. Conditional cash transfers 
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can only last for so long and developing programs to fight poverty within a specific time frame 
does not seem to have an everlasting effect. These programs also target a specific group or 
population and most of the time fail to reach the poorest of the poor.  
 Conditional cash transfers are one of the most researched economic development 
initiatives that are used worldwide in the fight against poverty. In some countries, CCTs have 
become the largest social assistance program, covering millions of households, as is the case in 
Brazil and Mexico. CCTs have been hailed as a way of reducing inequality, especially in the 
very unequal countries in Latin America; helping households break out of a vicious cycle 
whereby poverty is transmitted from one generation to another; promoting child health, nutrition, 
and schooling; and helping countries meet the Millennium Development Goals.
9
 But this still has 
not changed the general mood on modern day anti-poverty efforts. Many economist believe that 
foreign aid and anti-poverty efforts have failed to meet their mark and the field seems desperate 
for a breakthrough in their efforts.  
 This breakthrough will not happen overnight but thanks to Muhammad Yunus, the 
breakthrough can happen in a couple years time. While the development aid program of 
Microfinance has existed for quite some time now, it has yet to make a significant impact in the 
field of developing economics. Microfinance provides credit to the hands of the poor individual 
and can help developing economies establish a sound financial sector. One of the main reasons 
why this development program is so effective, is that the program is very cost friendly. Due to 
the cost associated with welfare programs existing today, the United States spent roughly $1.03 
trillion in 2011 on welfare programs alone, Microfinance provides the most viable and 
everlasting opportunity to increase a lower class citizens wealth. Microfinance is realistically 
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costless, if all loans are paid back in full. But with the potential to establish a sound financial 
sector within the region of a developing economy, Microfinance should be the main focus of a 
developing countries policy innovations related to anti-poverty programs. In theory the principle 
of Microfinance should never run out of funding.  
Microfinance or micro-credit is defined as a banking service targeted for unemployed or 
low-income individuals or groups, who typically do not have access to credit. The loans derived 
from these institutions can range from a loan as small as a bar of soap to a loan as large as one 
needed to start a shoe company. Microfinance institutions enable the opportunity to save income 
generated from Microfinance loans or elsewhere. The concept of Microfinance was pioneered by 
Muhammad Yunus along with six of his colleagues shortly after the country of Bangladesh 
gained its independence in the year 1978. The Bangladeshian famine in the year of 1974 hit close 
to home for professor Yunus who was teaching at Chittagong University at the time. While at the 
university teaching traditional practices of economics, such as Adam Smith's invisible hand 
theory, he was having members of his class come in not having eaten in hours or even days. The 
famine provoked him to lend his own money to a group of local farmers in the village in order 
for them to continue to run their business. Yunus in his book, Banker To The Poor : Micro-
Lending and the Battle Against World Poverty, reflected on why he gave out the money in the 
first place. He wrote,  
“What I did not know yet about hunger, but would find out over the next twenty-one 
years, was that brilliant theorists of economics do not find it worthwhile to spend time discussing 
issues of poverty and hunger. They believe that these will be resolved when general economic 
prosperity increases. These economists spend all their talents detailing the process of 
12 
 
development and prosperity, but rarely reflect on the origin and development of poverty and 
hunger. As a result, poverty continues.”10   
This prompted Yunus to think of credit as a human right and that credit can be scaled 
down to fit the demographic region a financial institution is operating in. Giving birth to the term 
microloans. Over the years Microfinance has evolved immensely. The first Microfinance 
organization was known as The Association for Social Advancement often referred to in 
Microfinance literature as ASA. ASA was created in Yunus’s home country of Bangladesh with 
the intentions of targeting some of the poorest villages in the country. ASA is essentially, “a 
bank for the poor”.11 ASA stands as part of a global Microfinance movement dedicated to 
expanding access to small scale loans, savings accounts, insurance, and broader financial 
services in poor and low-income communities. ASA has received high praise for its successes as 
a Microfinance institution but the traditional model of Microfinance comes from Grameen Bank, 
a Microfinance institution in Bangladesh pioneered by Yunus. Yunus received the Nobel Peace 
Prize for his work with the bank in the year 2006.  
 The general purpose of microlending is to provide credit to the poorest citizens of society 
in hopes that the loan can transition into positive earnings or even potentially turn into a 
successful small business. The lending practice gives poor citizens the opportunity to make a 
progressive change in their own life. It gives them a chance to pursue a desire they have never 
been financially able to in their life and this makes these citizens feel like they have a voice in 
their overall economy. It also exposes them to formal financial sector may. Most of these citizens 
lack the collateral needed for loans by a traditional finance institution. Although some 
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Microfinance banks do require initial collateral, most do not and these institutions tend to rely on 
social pressures for repayment.  
Microfinance lending comes in two forms, individual loans and group loans. The group 
lending aspect, first introduced by Yunus and Grameen Bank, brings a dynamic to the lending 
tool that can alleviate a whole community out of the deep depths of poverty. The loan is given to 
the individual but each group bears the same risk of default. One defaulted payment can lead to a 
termination of the entirety of the loan, providing a great incentive for these individuals to meet 
the loan requirements. Not only will these citizens bear the potential of losing its 
creditworthiness with the Microfinance institution, these citizens could lose the trust of its 
community members. Much of the early and traditional Microfinance practices relied heavily 
upon group loans for consistent repayment rates. Group lending allowed for borrowers within the 
community to interact with each other in a progressive way. This form of lending was one of 
many Microfinance innovations in the field to date.   
Microfinance has the potential to alleviate a whole group or region out of the deep 
dangers of poverty. All it takes is one successful microloan. A loan as small as $200 could be 
given to a farmer in the Latin America region to buy a machine used to grind coffee beans. This 
machine could then make packets of coffee beans five times faster allowing the farmer to 
increase its target audience for his product. By increasing his supply of coffee packets, the coffee 
maker is increasing the size of his potential target audience. The increase in the size of the target 
audience could then lead to an increase in demand. This then provides an incentive for the coffee 
maker to increase the labor supply of his business in order to keep up with the increase in 
demand. This would lead to hiring more workers which brings even more citizens out of poverty.  
14 
 
Microfinance’s ability to impact a greater amount of a population along with its ability to 
have an everlasting effect on a nation's economy, presents itself as the most efficient form of an 
anti-poverty program. Money makes the world go round and by granting capital to the hands of 
the poor, they now have the ability to change their lives for the better. With proper guidance and 
a non corrupt banking system, which is what these Microfinance institutions are suppose to 
provide, these impoverished citizens will gain access to capital and figure out what they need in 
order to live life above the poverty line.  
Microfinance is failing to meet its potential in the modern day market. Microfinance can 
be the driving force to end poverty by the year 2030, which was the goal set by the United 
Nations. This form of lending which is used by all countries world wide, has divided into two 
main frameworks. One model being known as the Southern Asia Microfinance model and the 
other model streams from the Latin American region. The Southern Asia model is based upon 
Yunus’s idea of the lending practice being used for the “social purpose”, whereas, the Latin 
American model is more focused on sustainability and microenterprises.  
In Latin America, Microfinance operates more like a business and thus was seen as a 
branch of the commercial banking system. This difference in operation can potentially be 
attributed to the economic conditions of both regions at the time Microfinance began. 
Specifically, in the 1970s when Microfinance began in Bangladesh, it was driven by a strong 
sense of idealism to address issues of poverty in rural areas which was widespread in the country 
as a result of the aftermath of the Bangladesh Liberation War. In contrast, as a result of the 
collapsing Bolivian populist regime, there was a widespread unemployment which led to the 
establishment of Banco Sol to help address issues of urban unemployment.  
15 
 
Thus, Microfinance emerged in Latin America as a tool to provide credit to the informal 
sector in building successful micro enterprises in urban areas. This led to the early embrace of 
the notion of profitability and commercialization in the region. Microfinance in Southern Asia 
developed as a aid program whereas Microfinance in Latin America started as program geared to 
serving microentrepreneurs. The Southern Asia Microfinance model was more suited to serve the 
poorest of the poor. However, the Latin American model started with serving the poor and as it 
has expanded due to the profit levels of these institutions, the Microfinance banks have started to 
serve the poorest of the poor.    
 With these initial ideological and economic differences surrounding the start of the 
industry in both regions, Microfinance in Southern Asia was more concerned about alleviating 
poverty than building successful microenterprises. In addition, Microfinance in Latin America  
focused on the poor rather than the poorest. Today, the industry in both regions is still 
characterized by these major differences, with Southern Asia being more inclined towards the 
alleviation of poverty while Latin America is more oriented towards the promotion of 
microenterprises.
12
 
Since the 2006 initial public offering that generated Compartamos Banco $468 million in 
profits, the Latin American microcredit model has incurred profits that has attracted global 
investors world wide. Compartamos Banco from its start in the year 2000 increased its target 
audience more than 15 times the initial amount. The bank today has branches spread out all 
throughout the country and even has branches in Guatemala and Peru. Compartamos Banco 
successes as a Microfinance institution has transitioned the small money lender into the size of a 
national bank.  
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However it is still unsure just how much of an impact the bank is having on the lowest 
class citizens of the Mexican economy. Mexico accounts for about 2.6% of the 2 billion 
unbanked adults worldwide.
13
 However, Compartamos has the potential to serve the 5,200,000 
citizens via Microfinance if the bank continues to expand in the proper form. The main reason 
why Compartamos is able to earn such high profit margins is the ridiculously high interest rates 
the bank charges on its loans. Compartamos average interest rate on a loan is close to 100% 
annually and for a citizen who does not have collateral to begin with, this is viewed as quite high. 
However the repayment rate on these loans is close to 97% as of the 4th quarter in 2017.
14
 
So are these interest rates the ones Compartamos Banco should charge if it is still trying to reach 
its economic development goal of financial inclusion by the year 2020? This is what my paper 
will examine. In the next chapter of this paper, I will analyze the history along with the current 
state of Microfinance in the Mexican economy using Compartamos as the main focus. While 
providing a summary on the origins of the Microfinance institution in the process. Furthermore, 
chapter three of this paper will consist of a outlook of the leader in Microfinance in Latin 
America, Peru. Chapter four will consist of a comparative analysis between the two 
Microfinance sectors and the concluding chapter will discuss the results from the comparative 
analysis as well as the implications of an interest rate cap.  
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Microfinance in Mexico  
 One of the most difficult task a country faces when working to obtain sustainability along 
with alleviating citizens out of poverty is, financial inclusion. The World Bank Group (WBG) 
considers financial inclusion a key enabler to reduce extreme poverty and boost shared 
prosperity, and has put forward an ambitious global goal to reach Universal Financial Access by 
2020.
15
 With the growth of Compartamos in recent years, Mexico, as a country, has a real chance 
to achieve this goal. Removing financial inclusion was the initial purpose of the bank in the first 
place, just at the community level. Compartamos was first started as a youth organization known 
as Gente Nueva. The group was founded in the year 1982 and the goal of the group was to 
improve the quality of life of Mexico’s marginalized communities through social action, health, 
and food programs.
16
  
 It did not take long for the Mexican government to notice the success of this particular 
group. In the year 1990 the Gente Nueva group which in spanish translates to, new people, 
transformed into an NGO known today as Compartamos which is Spanish translates to let us 
share. Carlos Danel and Carlos Labarthe are the two responsible for creating the banking branch 
of Compartamos and shortly after the name transformation, the group launched a pilot 
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community banking operation to fund income generating activities in two of the poorest states in 
Mexico, Chiapas and Oaxaca. The two were highly educated and both came from privileged 
families outside of Mexico City.
17
 They both had studied at disguised universities in their home 
country and Carlos Danel went to study at Harvard Business School. So one would assume they 
must’ve came across the works of development economist Muhammad Yunus at some point.  
Three years after the groups formation, the two founders of the group had noticed that the 
operations were going surprisingly smooth. Repayments on loans were arriving on time and 
some borrowers were even saving sums of the money that they borrowed. With having this high 
of a degree of success in just three years of the project, the two believed that it was time to 
expand the size of the group. The successes of the group meant that it was time for the bank to be 
exposed to what a real Microfinance sector looked like. This prompted the leaders of 
Compartamos to send one of its own workers out to Bangladesh to examine what Microfinance 
looks like in Yunus’s model. At the time Grameen Bank, the Microfinance institution pioneered 
by Yunus, had already been well established serving more than two million borrowers. 
Machillas, the Compartamos employee the two founders sent out to Bangladesh, was 
amazed with what the bank had done. Grameen began to operate multiple branches and planned 
to continue increasing in size. The Grameen Microfinance model was solely based upon the 
social good of Microfinance. The model Yunus and his team choose was one where the bank 
planned to target the poorest of the poor. The bank started in the poorest regions of Bangladesh 
and transitioned out to serving millions of borrowers all over the country. Compartamos planned 
to mimic the Grameen model in the early stages of its formation as the group really focused on 
increasing the size of its target audience. However, increasing the size of the target audience 
meant increased cost. In order for the group to expand as a whole, the two founders would have 
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to search for another means of funding. The aid they were receiving from groups such as, 
USAID, ACCION amongst others, was just not sufficient enough for the two founders to expand 
at the rate they were hoping for. In order to achieve the dreams the two founders of the bank had 
set out for one an another, they would need a more consistent flow of money.  
In the year 2000 their prayers were answered thanks to the support group ACCION. The 
investment made by ACCION international began Compartamos’ transition into a Microfinance 
institution. ACCION’s investment, allowed for the group to obtain their SOFOL license, 
enabling Compartamos the ability to reach capital markets. A SOFOL license is a Mexican 
business license that allows a company to partake in certain financing activities and be for profit. 
Carlos Danel said that, “In the next five years, Compartamos grew from 60,000 clients to 
600,000 with over $200 million debt.”18 The two founders dream had began to come true. The 
group now had the ability to access funds from all over the world but was still not operating as a 
“bank” due to the institutions inability to accept deposits. Fittingly, six years after the group 
obtained its SOFOL license, in the year 2006 Compartamos began to operate as a commercial 
bank. 
The commercial banking license, one may argue, prompted the leaders of the bank to 
focus more on profit rather than the social good of Microfinance. In the first year as a 
commercial bank Compartamos as a whole was thriving. The bank had a return on equity of 55% 
and profits did not seem likely to slow down anytime soon. The banks had expanded to all areas 
of the country both rural and urban, with its headquarters being located right in the capital of the 
country, Mexico City. The group had planned to extend its lending practice to 1.4 million clients. 
Typically, the poorest of the poor are not living in the nation's capital. Which made some 
question the motive for the transition. The banks move into the nation's capital brought much 
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attention to the bank around the world. Once people got a chance to look at the profit margins, 
investors became very interested. Compartamos was growing at unprecedented rates.  
Although profits continued to increase, funding from the initial help group ACCION 
international became much more limited and the two founders wanted to expand even more. The 
two at this point, had a vision to dominate the Microfinance sector in Mexico. To do this, the 
bank would need an everlasting stream of funds and where better to go than the global capital 
market. Compartamos began its initial public offering process in the year 2007 which sparked a 
hot debate across development economics. Economist were quick to deem Compartamos as a 
“for-profit institution” especially the Microfinance pioneer Muhammad Yunus. He refuses to 
even use the words Compartamos and Microfinance in the same sentence. When being asked  
how he felt about the initial public offering with Compartamos, he responded with, “When you 
discuss microcredit, don’t bring Compartamos into it,” he instructed. “Microcredit was created to 
fight the money lender, not to become the money lender.” Needless to say, Yunus was not 
amused with Compartamos move to become a public traded company. However, the initial 
public offering of Compartamos went more affluent that even the initial investors expected. 
19
 
 In April of 2007, Compartamos held a secondary initial public offering. The investors 
that sold 30% of their holdings made over $450 million. While some of the investors were NGOs 
who would be reinvesting their profit returns into economic development aid groups, others were 
just private investors that walked away with millions. The bank for sure incurred its profit with 
the initial public offering and this is one of the main reasons how Compartamos Banco became 
the largest microlender in Mexico today.  
Compartamos Banco unique market approach has given them an immense competitive 
edge in the Mexican Microfinance sector. The bank’s loans are intended for mostly women 
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borrowers. Historically, women borrowers have outperform male borrowers in terms of loan 
repayment and profit generated from the initial principle. Since its inception, Compartamos has 
mostly served women entrepreneurs largely in rural settings, with 98 percent female clients. 
However, in modern times, a fair amount of its business stream from the urban sector of the 
country. Its clients are involved in a variety of economic activities, such as food trade, handicraft 
production, and farming. At commercial banks where middle class men are the primary 
borrowers, repayment rates are typically less than 70 percent. Women borrowers at the Grameen 
Bank have repayment rates that have been 97 percent year after year.20 Women also spend the 
money generated from the Microfinance loans much more efficiently than men. Table 1 provides 
a general outlook of what Compartamos Banco looked like following the initial public offering. 
21
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Compartamos Banco offers four core products to its consumers. These four products are 
known as, Income Generator, Solidarity Group, Individual Credit, and Parallel Credit. The 
income generator product is used to generate income for micro entrepreneurs. The income 
generator product is ran through the Credito Mujer branch of the bank which specially focuses 
on loans directed towards women borrowers. This product requires a group of fifteen or more 
borrowers and accounts for over 87% of the loan portfolio for banks. The main focus of this 
product is to develop micro enterprises that could potentially lead a whole group or region out of 
the deep depths of poverty. With having a business continuously generating profits, more and 
more workers are going to be needed to uphold the market demand. Creating a need for the 
supply of workers in hopes that the group would hire from the local community that the micro 
enterprises is operating in.  
 The next product the bank offers are loans generate towards solidarity groups. These 
loans are created for a group with the same general economic interest. The groups for these 
specific loans are made up of 3 to 8 men or women. Solidarity group loans can range from loans 
needed by individuals for necessities such as water or food or loans needed by a group of micro 
entrepreneurs with the same general interest in business. These loans only account for 3.9 
percent of the banks total loan portfolio.  
 The individual credit product the bank offers works similarly to a personal loan offered 
by the typical commercial lender. The loans are offered to both men and women and offer a 
personal guarantee of repayment. These loans are typically much less common than group loans 
and come with an immense pressure to repayment. Defaulted individual credit loans will 
significantly lessen a borrowers chance to receive another loan from the bank. This product is 
responsible for 6.6 percent of the banks loan portfolio.  
23 
 
 The fourth and final product Banco Compartamos offers is parallel credit. These loans are 
targeted for specially women who already have had an existing income generating loan. This 
product was created to eliminate the currency risk associated with borrowing the Mexican peso. 
In order to account for the impact of inflation, Compartamos would borrow the equivalent 
amount of funds from another local lender in a different country to match the loans present value 
amount with the future payment stream. Although the amount of these loans only account for 2.1 
percent of the total portfolio, as Mexico begins to develop its financial sector the amount of these 
types of loans are expected to increase. 
An analysis of the performance of these four products was discussed in authors Manuela 
Angelucci, Dean Karlan and Jonathan Zinman article titled, Microdit Impacts: Evidence from a 
Randomized Microcredit Program Placement Experiment by Compartamos Banco.
22
 This article 
reflects on a case study the authors performed within the northern region of Mexico. This case 
study was designed to test the economic impact at the community level, of the largest 
microlender in Mexico, Compartamos Banco. Using a clustered randomized sample made up of 
all female borrowers and over 16,000 household surveys, the authors analyzed the case study to 
estimate the impact of a group lending expansion at an annual interest rate of 110%, which was 
20% lower than the market rate. By assigning a controlled and a treated group to the citizens 
residing in the Sonora region of Mexico, the case study was organized to show the overall 
economic effects of this microcredit experiment.  
 The two groups were designed so that one group had access to Compartamos loans along 
with being provided advertising, such as door to door promotions and/or radio ads. The other 
group was not granted access to loans from Compartamos and was forced to go elsewhere for 
                                               
22
Angelucci, Dean Karlan, and Jonathan Zinman. 2015. “Microcredit Impacts: Evidence from a Randomized 
Microcredit Program Placement Experiment by Compartamos Banco.” American Economic Journal: Applied 
Economics, no. 1: 151 
24 
 
their borrowing needs. The case study tested for community level impacts across 6 domains: 
micro entrepreneurship, income, labor supply, expenditures, social status, and subjective well 
being. The case study results showed that borrowing at high interest rates leads to negative 
economic impacts as expected by many. Having these less fortunate citizens borrow at such a 
high interest rate makes it nearly impossible to intake any profit. But these businesses are making 
money. 
 In this experiment, it was evident that the businesses receiving the loans were spending 
the money properly along with experiencing increasing revenues. Yet, they still failed to 
generate increased profits. The authors also mentioned another implications as to why the case 
study did not significantly impact the economy is because of the demographic region in which 
they operated in. In specific, they mentioned that the region dealt with high crime rates along 
with individual migration due to the location being so close to the American border. Which 
would have effects on how these citizens spent the profit intaken from the loan. However the 
authors were skeptical about statistical significance of the case study. They suggested further 
research to identify the extent of heterogeneous effects from expanded access to credit.  
This article amplifies the modern day debate within Microfinance. Muhammad Yunus’s 
depiction on the bank is not the kindest to say the least. He believes Compartamos is nothing but 
a brute moneylender, the very beast that Grameen Bank was built to root out. For Yunus, 
Microfinance institutions should be “social businesses” driven by social missions. After all, like 
most other Microfinance institutions, Compartamos could have substantially reduced interest 
rates which would than have lead to a decrease in profit rates and nonetheless expanded. Just at a 
somewhat slower pace.
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In the fourth quarter of 2017 Compartamos Banco had a loan portfolio consisting of 
2,457,090 clients. The bank has more than tripled in size since the initial public offering and has 
now expanded to Peru and Guatemala.
24
 The bank has over 268 branches spread out through the 
country and is still charging interest rates in the triple digits. When asked about where the profits 
are being invested in, the two founders continue to respond with expansion along with increased 
salary for their workers. The two co-CEO’s made millions of dollars from the initial public 
offering and profits have not decreased since than. The bank has repeatedly posted positive 
earning portfolios and this begs the question, when will Compartamos begin to focus their 
Microfinance operations strictly for the social good of the country?   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Microfinance in Peru  
The profits Microfinance institutions earn are beginning to scale up to the profits earned 
by a typical bank in a developed country like the United States. The interest income earned from 
the publicly traded Microfinance corporation Gentera was 271.22 million US dollars in the fiscal 
year of 2017.
25
 Gentera owns three separate Microfinance institutions in Latin America. One in 
Guatemala, Compartamos S.A., one in Mexico, Banco Compartamos, and one in Peru, 
                                               
24
Gentera, 2017 “Gentera Reports 4Q17 Results” Gentera 2Q17 Results 
25
Gentera, 2017 “Gentera Reports 4Q17 Results” Gentera 2Q17 Results 
26 
 
Compartamos Financiera. The company has become a household name in the Microfinance 
industry. However, Gentera is generally known for its presence in the Mexican Microfinance 
sector. This is in large part do to the competition in other Microfinance sectors. Which is why 
Peru is known as one of the most efficient Microfinance sectors in the world.  
Competition is immensely important for the stability of an economy. As seen with the 
rise of towns and village enterprises in China during the mid to late 20th century, efficient 
regulation and business experimentation can lead to stable and consistent economic growth. 
China was experiencing an economic drought during the 1950-1970 and began to produce in 
mass amounts in order to boost economic growth. With efficient regulation and continued 
experimentation, the country was able to grow into one of the largest economies of the world. 
Before the Chinese government introduced several economic growth reforms in 1979, the 
average annual GDP growth rate in China was an estimated 5.3% from 1960 to 1978. But in the 
year 2010, this number almost doubled and the economy began to grow at a rate of 10.5%.
26
   
 China’s economic success was in large part do to the growth of its rural sector. China 
wanted to decentralize the economy and began to focus their economic development on the rural 
sector. In the year 1996, 48% of exports were from town and village enterprises located in the 
rural areas of the country along with generating 107 million new jobs from the years 1978 to 
1996.
27
 The socialist structure of the country made it easier for the country to monitor funding 
and control business operations but this is not to say that it isn’t possible for a capitalist economy 
to perform the same way.  A “bottom” up economic transition, similar to China’s, was drawn out 
by the country Peru with help from Germany and their German Agency for Technical 
Cooperation. (GTZ)   ” 
                                               
26
 The Guardian “China GDP: How It Has Changed since 1980.”  
27
Albert Park “The Rise and Fall of Township and Village Enterprises” 
27 
 
Peru is one of the world’s most competitive and innovative Microfinance markets and 
often finds itself atop international country rankings for having the best business environment for 
Microfinance. The Microfinance industry in Peru has contributed to the development of the 
Peruvian economy and has greatly benefited the general population. Over the past decade, Peru 
has been one of the fastest-growing economies in Latin America, with an average annual GDP 
growth rate of 5.9 percent and a low average inflation rate of 2.9 percent. Peru experienced 
strong growth in both employment and income as well as lowering lower poverty rates. In 2005, 
an estimated 55.6 percent of Peru’s population was in poverty; in 2015, the poverty rate declined 
to approximately 21.8 percent.
28
 GDP during this time frame increased from 76 billion to close 
to 190 billion.
29
 
 Peru’s bottom up economic transition began during dark times. When Mohammed Yunus 
initially began to practice Microfinance in his home country of Bangladesh during the year 1976, 
Peru was in the start of a brutal Civil War. Along with recovering from one of the worst 
earthquakes the country had ever seen in the year 1974. The country was in a context of high 
inflation, virulent terrorism, institutional breakdown, economic collapse and a once in a century 
natural disaster.
30
 However, economist Gabriel Gallo still had hope for the success of the Peru 
economy. Gallo at age 21, came up with a thesis that suggested the key factor to economic 
growth in Peru was the implication of a municipal bank. He believed in the importance of strong 
government regulation in the early stages of Microfinance institutions. 
The Caja’s, the name given to the municipal banks Gallo came up with, started with 
funds from both the public and private sectors. But after the initial capital is put up, the Caja’s 
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are really pushed to generate their own profit in order to continue performing business initiatives 
and keep up with the demand from the market. The main reason behind this, for the start-up 
Microfinance institution, is that this will encourage the bank to promote savings. Promoting 
savings provides the bank with more leniency when going about their loan processes along with 
furthering the financial education of the borrowers. The principal sources of funds for 
Microfinance between 1989 and 2009, were deposits (58 %), market borrowing (24 %), and 
reinvested earnings (18 %). 
29 
 
The Peruvian Microfinance sector received a jumpstart from a numerous amount of 
individuals. The impact of Germany and their foreign aid efforts really paved the way for the 
economic successes of this industry. Germany provided mobile banks, better known as 
Mercedes-Benz buses, along with educational classes in both their home country and in Peru. 
They were the guiding hand in the early stages of growth for the Microfinance sector. This 
allowed for Peru’s policy makers to gather knowledge on what microcredit was suppose to be 
30 
 
and how it works. This led to the country establishing a formal business plan for the 
Microfinance model and allowed for the sector to establish core principles which have had a 
large impact on the overall economy. These core principles that exist for these Microfinance 
institutions consist of, attracting savings and deposits, targeting entrepreneurs, and targeting 
women. The end goal of the business model for all of these Microfinance institutions in the 
industry is to become a full service bank.
31
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Depicted above are the classifications of the different entities that provide micro-loans to 
the poor. Regulated institutions fall into six different legal structures: Banks: full-service 
regulated institutions that cater to individuals and small and micro businesses, Finance 
Companies: offer most banking services to 9 corporate clients and some have begun to focus on 
micro enterprises Municipal “Cajas”: municipally owned institutions that can receive deposits 
and lend, Rural Banks: originally focused on the agricultural sector, can lend and accept deposits 
but do not offer checking accounts, EDPYME (Entities of Development for Small and Micro 
Enterprises): non-bank regulated institutions that are not permitted to receive deposits and Credit 
Unions: cooperatives that can accept deposits and lend, however these companies are held to 
ambiguous regulatory standards.
32
 
The key factor for growth of the Peruvian Microfinance sector is the impact of 
competition. Due to a real decentralized Microfinance sector, institutions all across the country 
have an opportunity to start as a money lender. With the obvious need for finances for these less 
fortunate citizens, the demand for a micro loan is extremely high leading to a large amount of 
micro institutions. In order to remain self sufficient and appeal to a specific customer base, the 
market plays more of a role in setting the interest rates rather than the institution. The 
Microfinance sector in Peru has established a competitive interest rate, which is what the 
Mexican microcredit sector is missing.  Along with establishing a bridge between the public and 
private sector in Microfinance that allows for efficient regulation as well as a real effective 
foreign aid division.  
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Peru has been able to use its social relationships to their maximum potential. This 
immensely important economic tool has had a trickle down effect from the political body of the 
country to the citizens in the country trying to make a difference. Establishing sound foreign aid 
practices within the Microfinance sector has proved to be very beneficial for the people of the 
economy. As seen in the early stages of the sector with the bottom up economic transition 
designed by the GTZ, the private sector has been used productively in order to boost economic 
growth. And this trend has continued throughout time in the country of Peru.  
In the year 2005, a Peruvian NGO known as PRIMSA, began to work with local 
communal banks and researchers in order to build up the local rural economies of the country. 
The company designed a program for Microfinance institutions that provided a unique twist to 
the concept of “group lending.” The lending practice stemmed from the idea of collateralized 
risk in the economy and the reliance upon social pressures in order to reinsure loan repayment. 
The researchers and PRISMA, “...implemented a new loan product and administered surveys to 
9,000 shantytown households. This program sought to use social connections to screen for 
responsible clients, outside of the traditional group lending model, by requiring new clients to 
match up with sponsors who were already bank clients in order to obtain a loan.” 33 Which in a 
sense became a model of innovative group lending. Authors Dean Karlan, Markus M. Mobius, 
Tanya S. Rosenblat, and Adam Szeidl performed a case study on the matter. In their article titled, 
“Measuring Trust in Peruvian Shantytowns” the four researchers hosted a field experiment in 
two Lima, the capital of Peru, shantytowns.  
The experimented consisted of 200 individual households and was used to monitor the 
impact of an interest rate as well as social trust. The interest rate on the loans were randomly 
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generated as the researchers became very clever when designing the experiment. They hired a 
company to generate these random Microfinance rates that would not exceed above five percent. 
The company also helped with locating co-signers from local community banks. The borrowers 
were then provided with a card that looked like this. 
 
With this card the borrower was able to find a cosigner to his loan in order to enforce social 
pressures when making the loan repayment. However, to account for the risk of loss, after the 
loans are processed a second randomization relieves some co-signers from 50% of their financial 
responsibility.  
 What the authors wanted to test for in this case study was the trade off between having a 
direct friend co sign the loan versus an indirect friend. As seen with the country Mexico, group 
34 
 
lending can have a great impact on the Microfinance sector of an economy. Instilling social trust 
within a community will eventually lead to financial trust and that has been the case with Mexico 
thus far as their group borrowers have been able to repay loans with an APR of up to 100%. In 
the Peru case, the results were not what most would have expected.  
 
 
35 
 
 
Direct friend co-signers had less of a total repayment rate than indirect friends. In their article, 
the authors describe the event by saying, 
“Cosigning by a friend vs. a stranger is equivalent to about 3 percent change in monthly 
interest. Cosigners rely on multiple mechanisms when deciding whether to sponsor friends. In 
contrast, non-friends mostly sponsor high-quality borrowers. This result suggests that 
microfinance programs that rely on informal enforcement, such as group lending, might be 
necessary to reach a larger pool of borrowers.”  
36 
 
 Social trust is an important aspect of the Peruvian economy but this characteristic seems to be 
lacking in terms of the countries Microfinance sector. 
34
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Peru Vs Mexico 
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As time has gone along, Microfinance has continued to grow. Microcredit is represented 
by 19.2% of the credit portfolio in Peru and 15% in Mexico. In Peru, 2,839,649 citizens have 
participated in Microfinance and their microcredit portfolio is a little bit over 8.2 billion dollars. 
In Mexico, 5,630,677 citizens have received microcredit loans and the country’s microcredit  
portfolio is just over 2 billion dollars. The average microcredit rate in Peru is 25.7% and in 
Mexico, the rate is 74.7% 
As seen from just these base statistics, it is no surprise as to why Peru is ranked as the 
better business environment in the Microfinance industry according to the Economic Intelligence 
Unit. Peru has been able to establish a competitive microcredit rate that fluctuates with changes 
in price of the market. The two countries Microfinance business model and structure differ but 
both still keep the same general principle of profitability and sustainability. This chapter will 
38 
 
discuss, in more detail, the business approach of each industry along with analyzing how funding 
is generated in both Microfinance sectors. 
35
 
One of the driving forces in the Peruvian Microfinance sector was the adaption of the 
Cajas. Between 2002 and 2013, Peru was one of the fastest-growing countries in Latin America, 
with an average GDP growth rate of 6.1 percent annually. In terms of GDP, the financial sector 
grew at an average annual rate of 8.3% in the six years prior to 2013.
36
 An efficient Microfinance 
sector along with sound foreign aid policies, strong macroeconomic policies and structural 
reforms in different areas created a scenario of high growth and low inflation. The efficient 
growth in employment and income sharply reduced poverty rates. The poverty rate, the 
percentage of the population living on US$ 5.50 a day, fell from 52.2 percent in 2005 to 26 
percent in 2013. This is equivalent to 6.4 million people escaping poverty during that period. 
Extreme poverty, the population living on US$ 3.20 a day, declined from 30.9 percent to 11.4 
percent in the same period.
37
 In terms of GDP, the financial sector grew at an average annual rate 
of 8.3% in the six years prior to 2013.
38
 
The design and implementation of the municipal banks was the building block of the 
Microfinance boom in the country of Peru. All of the time spent working with the German GTZ 
organization paid off and Peru's Microfinance sector business environment is now atop the 
world. The Cajas humble origins most definitely played a role in their success.  
The Cajas rely heavily on funding received from the government in their early stages of 
operation. The money the Caja’s receive from the government comes from three different 
funding pools. These are, the taxes and income generated by the Peruvian government, foreign 
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direct investment into the government of Peru, as well as NGOs. The savings-and-credit 
Municipal Cash Shop System in Peru are known for their decentralized structure. The decisions 
the Caja’s make are without majority control and by a diverse board that includes civil society 
representation. Cajas Municipales are one of five institutional modalities for Microfinance 
subjected to official regulation by the Peruvian banking authority. Better known as the 
Superintendence of Banking, Insurance and Private Pension Funds (SBS). The entire 
Microfinance system includes 42 regulated and 76 unregulated MFIs. There are 13 Cajas in Peru 
today, with 91% of lending and 73% of savings being held outside of the capital, Lima. The 
Cajas Municipales hold a 40.6% share of the Microfinance industry. Between 1982 and 1986, six 
Cajas Municipales were founded in five different regions across Peru. Today there are twelve, 
with 514 offices spread through every one of Peru’s 25 regions. Initially Cajas only offered 
pawn-secured loans and were restricted to operations in their own region. According to the 
Economist Intelligence Unit, in 2011 “Peru finished atop the Global Microscope for a third 
straight year, buoyed by an excellent legal framework, sophisticated regulators and a government 
commitment to use Microfinance to expand financial access to the poor”.39 The Caja’s 
relationship with the government paved the way for a sound regulation system as well as a great 
lender of last resort in case one of the Caja’s were to struggle with funding loans. Caja Trujillo is 
known as one of the pioneers in the industry. It is known by its official name in Spanish, the Caja 
Municipal de Ahorro y Crédito or CMA 
 As the Microfinance institution had grown larger and larger, they started to provide loans 
to micro and small enterprises, offer savings accounts and other saving instruments and, since 
2002, supply a diverse range of banking services. One of the keys to the Caja approach is the 
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openness of the risk management methodology, with business procedures centred on the 
customer and not the institution. Cajas were allowed to operate outside of their region with a 
cost. This cost was a more complex legally authority. These institutions were allowed to move 
into different regions if the Caja had proved an ability to conduct simpler operations and fulfil 
certain capital and risk-provision requirements. One of the most important banking operations 
the Caja’s have adopted is its credit evaluation methodology, which moved away from formal 
guarantees or collaterals to a cash-flow analysis of customers’ repayment capacity.40  
The Cajas are incentivized to serve customers primarily in the private sector. There has 
been instances where the government has been involved in the Cajas operations but these 
scenarios typically take place in a densely poor populated community. The government is aware 
that the borrowers may not be as credit worthy as other regions in the county and they focus on 
bringing all regions out of poverty. A wise man once said, you are only as strong as your weakest 
link, and the phrase seems to have stuck with the policy makers of the Peruvian government.  
 This is not to say that Mexico does not try to accomplish the same goal. Mexico has also 
adopted a Caja municipal system to try to regionally develop its economy. The Mexican 
government has also prioritized this policy goal and launched its National Financial Inclusion 
Strategy in June 2016, which plans to accelerate access to financial services for more than half of 
the population currently left out of the formal, regulated financial system. The Mexican 
government is at the frontier of this important initiative to promote access to basic financial 
services and fund investments in the country’s medium to small micro-enterprises. It has been 
one of the fastest growing Microfinance sectors across Latin America as well as Peru, and is 
impressive in its focus on women, and consistently, small average-loan sizes, a testament to the 
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success of the institutions in serving low income communities in peri-urban and rural areas. 
Unfortunately, the Mexican Microfinance sector also stands out for the prohibitive cost of 
credit.
41
 
The Cajas in Mexico have fallen far short of their potential and this is in large part due to 
the structure of financing in the country. Mexico is too reliant upon public funding in their 
development process and it have led to an over abundance of public Microfinance institutions. 
These institutions have struggled to earn a profit that would allow them to compete with the 
private Microfinance institution’s. This is in large part due to Compartamos ability to dominate 
the sector. 
Compartamos has been one of the best happenings in the Mexican microfinance sector as 
well as one of the worse. Compartamos, since it’s IPO has absolutely dominated the private 
Microfinance sector. The bank began with humble origins and now one could argue, it functions 
along the lines of a brute money lender. Mexico City is the headquarters of the bank as well as 
the financial capital of the country. If the bank is able to gain less fortunate urban customers, the 
bank may be able to transition into a full service commercial bank which would have a huge 
impact of the deposits taken-in by the bank. Compartamos Banco currently has an average 
deposit account balance of 53 US dollars. MiBanco, a Microfinance institution in Peru, has an 
average deposit of 2,468 US dollars. Compartamos seems to be content by serving as solely a 
Microfinance institution. However, if the bank were to transition into a full fledged commercial 
bank, the bank will be able to experience higher bank deposits which would have a significant 
impact on financing the operation cost of the bank.  
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A case study performed by the impact investing group Triple Jump summarized the 
statistics for the institution along with a little background information as to what the experiment 
consisted off and what its findings were.  
By efficiently lowering the interest rates, Compartamos will make room for more 
competition in the industry. Mexico is currently experiencing a case of over funding in the public 
sector and it now needs to crowd into the public sector. Recently, a report was compiled by the 
World Bank titled, “Financial Sector Assessment: Mexico”. In the article, the authors analyze the 
43 
 
overall finance sector and talk about what is needed for a more efficient and growing sector. The 
article mentions the importance of development banks in Mexico’s Microfinance sector. In the 
opening pages of the report, the authors talk about suggestions for the country’s finance sector. 
They write, 
 “...policies should be more focused on “crowding-in” the private sector, avoiding market 
distortions, ensuring sustainability of pricing programs, and phasing-out gradually from those 
beneficiaries that can already be served by the private sector. Financial access could be 
broadened through a vibrant ecosystem of financial institutions complementing the commercial 
banking sector. The numerous types of “other financial institutions” already coexist in Mexico 
but lack the scale to provide an alternative solution to banks. They attend a large number of 
clients in remote areas but offer limited services. Consolidating and articulating common 
initiatives to reduce costs could overcome the issues posed by their small size, limited funding 
capacity, and low profitability, which remain big challenges.”42 
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A problem in the Mexican finance sector does not seem to be the capability of their 
funding. Their is enough money allocated in the system for it to function efficiently and 
effectively just like Peru. One of the most interesting statistics of the direct comparison between 
Compartamos Banco (Mexico) and MiBanco(Peru). The chart below shows that the cost of 
lending along with the cost of borrowing are lower in Mexico. 
43
 
This would entail that Compartamos gets their loans for a cheaper price along with 
having their customers pay a cheaper price for each loan they recieve. So how has MiBanco 
become able to produce such efficient growth statistics while keeping the idea of social welfare 
in tact? This is in large part due to the structure and business model of the institution. The 
transformed Microfinance institution has established innovative products in a competitive 
monopolistic sector.  
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 In 1998, Grupo ACP an impact investing group, converted part of its division into a 
separate entity know as Mibanco. Mibanco was Peru’s first full service Microfinance bank. 
Mibanco offers both credit and savings products and has since become the leader and largest 
MFI in the Peruvian Microfinance industry. In addition to Mibanco, one of its main competitors 
is known as Financiera Edyficar (Edyficar). 
Edyficar was originally founded in 1997 as an NGO but transitioned into an EDPYME in 
1998 when it realized it could not access the financing required to expand its Microfinance 
operations under a non-profit structure. Their transition was very similar to the one of 
Compartamos, except Edyficar received funding from international aid organizations such as the 
IMF. By the end of 2006, Edyficar was the largest EDPYME in Peru. Its main product, which 
accounted for approximately 90 percent of its loans, was individual loans to micro- and small 
enterprises. By 2008, Edyficar reconstituted as a financiera (a deposit-taking financial 
institution), a corporate formation just short of a fully functioning bank. Edyficar went on to 
become Peru’s second-largest MFI. Peru clearly had an abundance of foreign influence early in 
the development of its Microfinance industry. Soon, with the foundation provided by foreign 
influences, Peru would build its own unique Microfinance structure.   
Prior to the success of Edyficar and Mibanco, traditional commercial banks were 
reluctant to enter Microfinance markets due to a lack of transparency regarding the risk of 
lending to the poor. The established banking sector believed that the poor were financially 
illiterate and did not have adequate cash flow generating capacity. Therefore, they would not be 
able to pay back the interest and principal on loans. In addition, banks were worried about the 
poor’s lack of collateral to secure these high-risk loans. However, as the profitability of 
Microfinance in Peru was proved by Edyficar and Mibanco, the big Peruvian banks began to 
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enter the sector. Due to this increase in competition, MFIs needed to improve efficiency, expand 
services, increase innovation, and reduce interest rates on loans.   
In 2009, BCP, the largest bank and supplier of integrated financial services in Peru, 
owned by the financial holding company Credicorp, demonstrated its interest in the thriving 
Microfinance sector by acquiring Edyficar, the second-largest Microfinance institution in Peru, 
for $95 million. In 2014, BCP also acquired Mibanco, the largest MFI in Peru, for $179.5 million 
through Edyficar. These two deals were by far the most significant in shaping the future of 
Peruvian Microfinance. 
The acquisition of Mibanco was intended to create value through economies of scale, 
savings through more appropriate funding structures, and reduced client acquisition costs. 
Although BCP decided not to merge these institutions into its own brand and instead chose to 
maintain them as separate companies dedicated to serving the Microfinance sector, the newly 
formed entity would become the largest Microfinance institution in Peru, with a 19.5 percent 
market share. As the major commercial banks joined in the wave of consolidation, Microfinance 
was amalgamated with the commercial banks and solidified its place as an integral part of the 
Peruvian financial system.
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So should Mexico’s finance sector begin to expand its merger and acquisition division 
into Microfinance? The Peru story provides a prevailing case but this may lead to Compartamos 
only becoming even more dominant in the private sector. What is needed for the Mexican 
Microfinance sector is an interest rate cap along with more funding allocated into the private 
sector. An interest rate cap will allow for more freedom of entry and exit into the sector along 
with establishing a competitive rate. The cap does not have to and should not last forever. But, 
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for Mexico, an interest rate cap is needed in order to balance the competition between the public 
and private sector.  
The structure of the funding plays a huge role in the progress of the Mexican 
Microfinance sector and Peru’s mergers and acquisitions Microfinance division should be used 
as a model to overcome the challenges within it. By allocating an interest rate cap in the field, the 
public sector Microfinance institutions will be able to gain some ground against Compartamos. 
Instead of having to borrow from 6 MFI’s just to get one of Compartamos loans.45 Compartamos 
will have to re-emphasize its business model to maintain a plan of slowth growth and continued 
expansion or they will have to acquire smaller Microfinance institutions in order to function 
along the lines of a commercial bank. This would allow for more players to get into the field of 
Microfinance and spread out the competition.  
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 The main implication of the previous chapter is that the interest rates charged on 
Compartamos Banco Microfinance loans could potentially lead to a financial crises. A great 
analogy to use when talking about the current state of the Microfinance sector in Mexico is the 
game of musical chairs. The game of musical chairs is set up by players sitting on chairs 
arranged in a circle. The music starts and the players start circling, dancing, and running. While 
chairs are progressively removed. Then the music stops and chaos erupts as the players seek to 
find a place to sit. In Mexico, the number of chairs remaining is few indeed, even as the MFIs 
continue to dance. The recently published study by the Microfinance CEO Working Group 
shows just how few chairs are left. The published numbers seem bad enough: some 21% of the 
Microfinance loan applicants to FINCA Mexico already hold four or more loans. Adding those 
holding three loans, we get 33% of applicants. 
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By looking at the Triple Jump chart depicted above, it seems as if the Mexico 
Microfinance sector may be dancing with a financial bubble. It is beginning to get to the point 
where this bubble, may pop. Financial over-indebtedness in the microcredit division of the 
country is beginning to become seriously alarming. Mexico’s low income community has the 
highest amount of multiple borrowings in any microcredit sector. However, this may not be the 
worse thing if the country is able to formulate policy in the correct way to ensure repayment of 
all microcredit loans. 
The multiple borrowings in Mexico shows that the low income community is very 
interested in receiving credit. By having loans with multiple financing institutions, they also 
create relationships that build financial trust. Having this financial trust from multiple 
Microfinance institutions will make it even easier for the borrowers to access credit. It's just that 
in the case of Mexico, this over borrowing is in large part due to customers wanting to maintain 
an everlasting relationship with Compartamos.  
Compartamos credit divisions are not what the low income borrowers are particularly 
interested in. It is the other products that the institution provides such as life-insurance policies 
and home insurance which really garner the attention of the borrowers. It comes as no surprise to 
see that the Credito Mujer division of the bank, translated in english as woman credit, is the 
highest profitable section of the bank. The woman who borrow from Compartamos do it to 
benefit themselves and not their finances. This speaks volumes to the job Compartamos has done 
in raising the financial education for the low income community but more can be done to further 
economic growth. Compartamos has done their part and it is now time for the government to step 
in and take the Microfinance sector to where it needs to be.  
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The equilibrium level for the Mexican Microfinance sector may take years to achieve and 
this is something that the Compartamos Banco executives have failed to realize. Profits can run 
out but let's hope that for Compartamos they do not. The finance sector will definitely feel the 
impact if this were to happen. In the Mexican Microfinance sector, one would have to start with 
calculating where the money is spent from the interest yield. Operating costs are the largest 
component and account for 57% of its structure. Its value increased from 30.8% in 2006 to 
42.9% in 2015. By disaggregating operating costs, it was identified that the most significant 
subcomponent is personnel expenses, which represent 70% of the operating costs substructure. 
The main concern with the level of this subcomponent is the reasonableness of wages, coupled 
with the low level of productivity and the high level of staff turnover.   
Compartamos is known for its operations in the rural sector of the Mexican economy 
which is known to have a high operating cost. Some of the bank's customers will ride with loan 
officers for distances up to two hours just to deposit a check at a Compartamos Banco. In order 
for the interest rate cap to have a real impact in the microcredit industry, the government would 
have to regionally adapt the cap to fit the demographic region in which it is operating in. For 
areas of the economy with established Microfinance institutions in the rural sector, a cap may be 
heighted while a cap in the urban area of the city may be lower to attract more competitors. 
Lowering the interest rate cap in the urban areas would also attract more borrowers which is a 
characteristic the Mexican sector is missing. Peru’s Microfinance profits started in the urban 
sector and then had a trickle down effect to the rural sector. The Microfinance institutions were 
able to use their profits earned from the densely populated city area to expand business 
operations in the rural sector which had a high demand for credit. The commitment to 
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Microfinance by commercial banks in the country had a significant impact on the growth of the 
Microfinance industry as well.  
In conclusion, a regional interest rate cap would greatly benefit the Mexican 
Microfinance sector. Along with better regulation and increased funding to the private sector. 
There are several lessons that the Mexican government can learn from the Peru industry. Peru’s 
development of the Caja’s in the early stages of their Microfinance industry paved the way for 
monopolistic competition and a competitive interest rate. The Caja’s have been the backbone for 
Peru and their heavily regulated structure gives them a competitive edge against other public 
Microfinance institutions in Latin America. The growth of the mergers and acquisitions division 
in Peru played a huge role in shaping the Microfinance sector as well. Having the ability to gain 
microcredit from all financial institutions possible in a developing nation is vital for economic 
growth. But so is the sustainability and profitability of these institutions. Mexico’s adoption of an 
interest rate cap will incorporate these two factors while increasing the level of competition. A 
policy initiative the government should try is allocating different interest rate caps to the regions 
that the Caja municipal systems operate in. This cap can be monitored and effectively placed 
according to the financial and demographic region the Microfinance institutions are operating in. 
The cap will drive the demand up for technological innovations in the field to increase financial 
monitoring. Another aspect of the economy the Mexican sector can most definitely improve. 
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